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THE PUBLIC PAYS, THE CORPORATION PROFITS: THE
EMASCULATION OF THE PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE
AND A NOT-FOR-PROFIT SOLUTION
Dale F. Rubin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive subsidies by state and local governments to private
corporations1 for the purpose of inducing such corporations to
retain or locate facilities in their respective locales are attract-
ing greater public scrutiny.' Commentators are beginning to
question whether the public entity receives benefits anywhere
near the value of the subsidy. In Virginia, where Governor
George Allen proposed giving the Walt Disney Corporation $163
million in subsidies to establish a theme park, the public re-
sponded with bumper stickers that read "Virginia Pays-Disney
Profits." 3
* Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University;, A.B., 1966, Stanford Uni-
versity;, J.D., 1970, University of California at Berkeley. I extend a special thanks to
Hans Linde, Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice, who spent hours assisting me in
working through the conceptual problems posed by this paper. I would also like to
thank Professor Okianer Christian Dark, whose incisive and detailed comments were
invaluable. In addition, I would like to thank the Willamette Law Faculty, and the
participants of the 1994 Scholars of Color Conference, who took the time to read and
comment on this paper, as well as Tim Kelley, Willamette Research Librarian, and
Mary Gilbertson in Library Acquisitions. Finally, I extend my thanks to Thomas
"Crow" Kahn and Candace Kesey, Faculty Secretary.
1. Unless otherwise noted, reference to private corporations will mean a "for
profit" private corporation.
2. Subsidies take several forms, but unless otherwise stated, the term "subsidy"
refers to government expenditures for the benefit of private corporations. This in-
cludes grants, public improvements that benefit a project, and low-interest loans fi-
nanced by the sale of tax-exempt bonds.
3. Scott Bates, Not so Fast, Mickey! Let's Deal Again, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, Feb. 21, 1994, at A7. The Disney Corporation subsequently renounced interest
in the proposal.
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In Alabama, government officials made several trips to Ger-
many for the privilege of expending $253 million4 in subsidies
to the Mercedes-Benz Corporation in exchange for the construc-
tion of an auto plant in Alabama.5 The City of Chicago and the
State of Illinois spent $150 million to retain the Chicago White
Sox baseball team when the team threatened to move to Flori-
da.' Finally, the City of Portland, Oregon gave millionaire
Microsoft founder Paul Allen $35 million to build a new stadi-
um for his Portland Trailblazers basketball team.7
What is the status of such subsidies in light of the Public
Purpose Doctrine? The Public Purpose Doctrine states that
public monies may only be spent for "public purposes." This
doctrine is a judicially imposed constitutional limitation on the
manner in which federal, state, and local governmental entities
may spend public funds.' If a court determines that a subsidy
is not for a public purpose, then such aid will be disallowed.
Hence, the judicial interpretation of the Public Purpose Doc-
trine is of crucial importance to private sector corporations who
seek government subsidies for their projects.
Currently, the substantial majority of courts have allowed aid
to private corporations based on whether they confer a "public
benefit" on the populace. For example, Rural Water District No.
3 Pushmataha County v. Antlers Public Works Authority9 ad-
dressed whether a public works authority could extend a subsi-
dy to a water district. The court ruled that the public purpose
requirement was satisfied because of the inherent public benefit
the arrangement conferred on its customers." Other cases
4. Bernard L. Weinstein, Can Alabama Afford a Mercedes?, ECON. TIMES, Oct.
1993, at 6. This subsidy is 2.3% of the state's tax base and averages $222,000 per
job. Id.
5. Susan Haedden, Dealing with Corporate Flight, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 13, 1994, at 62. Ms. Haedden states: "Rarely consulted about economic develop-
ment, voters are beginning to challenge the cost of corporate tax breaks-and they
are deciding that the catch is often not worth the bait." Id.
6. Alexandria Biesada, Gimme a Break: Your Tax Dollars at Work Enriching
Wealthy Team Owners, FIN. WORLD, July 9, 1991, at 40.
7. Newall Gilchrist, Blazers Rip City, PORTLAND FREE PRESS, Oct. 1993, at 1.
8. Breck P. McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 CAL. L. REV. 137, 137
(1929) ("It was to curb government expenditures that the Doctrine of Public Purpose
was first used in state court."). The doctrine was subsequently recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
9. 866 P.2d 458 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
10. Id. at 461; see also City of Charlottesville v. Dehaan, 323 S.E.2d 131 (Va.
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have stated that the legislative determination of public purpose
will stand unless it is irrational or arbitrary. In Associated
General Contractors v. Schreiner," the court considered
whether state government expenditures to promote the ethanol
industry were taxes levied for a public purpose. "In making
such decision [the legislature] is vested with a larger discretion
with which the courts should not interfere unless its action is
clearly evasive."' But as I shall demonstrate, if the phrase
"public benefit" is currently the lexicon driving public purpose
or if blind judicial obedience to legislative determinations of
what constitutes a public purpose is the test, then no real limi-
tations remain on the power of the government to tax its citi-
zens for the purpose of extending aid to private corporations.
This proposition is contrary to the great weight of judicial au-
thority in the nineteenth century, which generally ruled that
aid to private corporations doing business outside the internal
improvement sector was not for a public purpose. Thus, judicial
misuse of the Public Purpose Doctrine continues to buttress ill-
advised aid to private corporations, resulting in ever-increasing
debt to be paid by future generations of the unwitting public. 3
It is my contention that an examination of the historical
development of the Public Purpose Doctrine establishes that the
proliferation of the kind of public subsidies referred to above
(sometimes called public "give aways") 4 is unconstitutional. 5
This article will discuss several issues starting with the concept
that the limitation on the power of government to tax is well-
grounded in American jurisprudence. The article will then ad-
1984). But see Button v. Day, 158 S.E.2d 735 (Va. 1968).
11. 492 N.W.2d 916 (S.D. 1992).
12. Id. at 923; see also State ex rel. Ohio County Comm. v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2
(W.Va. 1980).
13. Even though most states have constitutional limitations that prohibit any aid
to private corporations, courts have created a "public purpose" exception to such pro-
visions. See Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and The Public
Purpose Doctrine, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 143 (1993) (stating that judicial cre-
ation of such an exception is unwarranted).
14. Robert Guskind, The Give Away Game Continues, PLANNING, Feb. 1990, at 4.
15. Since this article will discuss the Public Purpose Doctrine in the context of
state and local subsidies to private corporations, the term "unconstitutional" refers to
both federal and state constitutions. All fft states either have amended their consti-
tutions to include the doctrine or the doctrine has received judicial sanction. See, e.g.,
ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. VIM, § 1.
1994] 1313
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1311
dress the following points: (1) the Public Purpose Doctrine is a
judicially implied constitutional limitation on the legislative
power to tax; (2) the crucial proposition to the judicial sanction-
ing of public aid to railroads was the fact that railroad con-
struction was considered to be an obligation of the state, and
therefore aid to railroad companies was thought to be for a
public purpose; (3) the Public Purpose Doctrine is usually inter-
preted and applied in cases that arise in a setting of
overburdened public debt, political corruption, and fraud; (4) the
periods of economic chaos, caused in part by massive state and
local railroad debt, gave rise to able and vigorous opposition to
the judicial majority's application of the doctrine; (5) the Public
Purpose Doctrine is a judicially created doctrine, therefore
courts have the responsibility to interpret and apply the doc-
trine in appropriate cases; and (6) the judicial abdication of the
doctrine to legislative determination amounts to an abdication
of judicial responsibility.
Finally, this article posits that the constitutional limitation
on the power of governmental entities to spend tax dollars for
public purposes is more effective if such expenditures are chan-
neled through the nonprofit sector of the economy. Public
spending through a government-nonprofit paradigm would mini-
mize the ills spawned by public corruption and private greed
that characterized the evolutionary period of the Public Purpose
Doctrine.
It is important to stress that this article will only discuss the
Public Purpose Doctrine in the context of tax expenditures. The
following discussion should be distinguished from other consti-
tutional provisions regulating the power of government to
tax. 6 Additionally, this article does not discuss subsidies to
private corporations that do not involve expenditures,'7 al-
though each situation involves similar issues." In addition,
this article will not concern itself with the interplay of the
Public Purpose Doctrine and constitutional aid limitations pro-
16. Oregon's Constitution is typical. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 32, art. IV, § 1, art.
XI, § 11 (all concerning taxation).
17. For example, tax abatements, tax holidays and land write-downs.
18. The possibility of corruption and fraud in the granting of subsidies not involv-
ing expenditures is the same if the subsidies do involve such expenditures.
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visions'9 in which the courts have carved out a "public pur-
pose" exception."
11. FACTUAL CONTEXT N WHICH THE PUBLIC PURPOSE
DOCTRINE DEVELOPED
In spite of the longstanding rhetoric espousing self-reliant
private enterprise, the quest for public subsidies by private
enterprise is as old as the nation itself. Shortly after the sign-
ing of the Constitution, the State of New Jersey offered tax
abatements to induce Alexander Hamilton to locate his manu-
facturing plant in that state.2 This early instance of "public-
private partnering," a term which has currently become fashion-
able, marked the beginning of an era characterized by substan-
tial public aid to private corporations in the construction of a
national transportation system. Starting with the construction
of the Erie Canal in 1825 to which New York pledged its public
credit,' state governments made tremendous outlays of public
funds to private corporations to aid in the building of canals,
roads and railways.
19. Colorado's provision is typical. COLO. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2 provide the fol-
lowing-
§ 1. Pledging credit of state, county, city, town or school district
forbidden.
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town township or school
district shall lend or pledge the credit or faith thereof, directly or indi-
rectly, in any manner to, or in aid of, any person, company or corpora-
tion, public or private, for any amount, or for any purpose whatever, or
become responsible for any debt, contract or liability of any person, com-
pany or corporation, public or private, in or out of the state.
§ 2. No aid to corporations-no joint ownership by state, county,
city, or school district.
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, township, or school
district shall make any donation or grant to, or in aid of, or become a
subscriber to, or shareholder in any corporation or company or a joint
owner with any person, company, or corporation, public or private, in or
out of the state ...
COLO. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2.
20. See City of Aurora v. Public Util. Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1280 (Colo. 1990); see
also Rubin, supra note 13, at 161-66.
21. Peter W. Bernstein, States Are Going Down Industrial Policy Lane, FORTUNE,
Mar. 5, 1984, at 112.
22. Ellis L. Waldron, The Public Purpose Doctrine of Taxation 34-35 (1952) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Wisconsin on file with the Universi-
ty of Richmond Law Review).
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Officials successfully collected tolls from patrons of the Erie
Canal and thus relieved the state of further taxation and en-
couraged other states to increase their public investment in
private undertakings. However, the success of the Erie Canal
was not to be repeated. Excessive optimism encouraged by Eu-
ropean investors eager to purchase state securities led to an
overextension of credit which precipitated the panic of 1837.'
State enterprises failed because tolls were not sufficient to
service debt. As a result, states were virtually bankrupt. Short-
ly after 1837, state debts were estimated at $231 million and
local improvement obligations at $27 million.' The annual in-
terest charge on these obligations was close to $16 million,
which created a severe tax burden on a national population of
only seventeen million people. Since private capital was inade-
quate and foreign investors were unwilling to refund the debt,
states liquidated the transportation facilities they owned by
selling them to private corporations at drastically reduced pric-
es.' Other states, responding to the political outcry about ex-
cessive debt, simply repudiated their obligations. By 1850, at
least ten states, in reaction to widespread public dissatisfaction,
enacted constitutional state debt limitations and/or constitution-
al prohibitions against lending of state credit or subscribing to
stock in private enterprises." By 1857, almost all state consti-
tutions had been amended to include limitations on debt.'
However, such constitutional limitations applied only to
states, not to municipalities. As economic confidence returned
and attitudes toward the formation of private corporations be-
23. The Panic of 1837 rendered states unable to pay their bonded indebtedness
previously incurred for internal improvements. As a result, they began repudiating
their debts. ALBERT M. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS 34 (1936); See Horace Secrist,
An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Restrictions Upon Public Indebtedness in
the United States, 8 BULL. OF THE UNIV. OF WISO. 1, 21 (Apr. 1914).
24. FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND & FRED W. POWELL, RAILROAD PROMOTION AND
CAPITALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 113 (1909).
25. Id. at 103. For example, by 1844 Pennsylvania was more than $40 million in
debt arising out of the operation of its canal and railway operations. The railway
operations were eventually sold to the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1857 for $7,500,000.
Id.
26. The ten states were: Rhode Island (1842); New Jersey (1844); Louisiana, Tex-
as and Maine (1845); Iowa and New York (1846); Illinois (1847); Wisconsin (1848);
and California (1849).
27. See Secrist, supra note 23, at 54.
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came more liberal, municipalities began to incur debt for the
construction of internal improvements in the settlement of the
agricultural West. At this time, the emphasis on the construc-
tion of transportation facilities had shifted from canals to rail-
roads. By 1853, the municipal railroad debt of seven cities
alone-Wheeling, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Louisville,
New Orleans and Philadelphia-was more than $28 million.
This represented a per capita debt ranging from $20 in
Philadelphia to $55 in WheelingY By 1860, about
$1,500,000,000,' more than a quarter of the total active capi-
tal of the nation, was invested in railroads controlled by private
corporations. By 1870, state legislatures, responding to public
outcry over municipal debt, passed constitutional amendments
prohibiting both the state and the municipality from lending
credit, taking stock subscriptions in, or giving aid to private
corporations."m
Finally, there was the matter of corruption. Commentators
have observed that public sentiment in favor of requiring, by
constitutional amendment, states and local government to cur-
tail their excessive propensities to incur debt and to spend tax
monies, were in significant part based on the fraud by railroad
promoters and the corruption by public officials in subsidizing
the construction of railway systems. The Wisconsin experience
was typical:
Sober fear was expressed before Wisconsin accepted federal
land grants in aid of railroad construction, that the state
government would not have the strength to withstand the
temptations to partiality or corruption that would be gener-
ated out of contests to win these prizes. A major scandal in
1856 over the disposition of the first railroad grant, amply
confirmed these forebodings.3
28. CLEVELAND & POWELL, supra note 24, at 206.
29. Id. at 83.
30. Secrist, supra note 23, at 59-60.
31. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND EcONOMIc GROWTH, THE LEGAL HISTORY OF
THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915, at 55 (1964); see also Secrist, supra
note 23, at 58:
An equally objectionable thing, and one much more serious in its ulti-
mate consequences, was the state of mind which the unbridled use of the
credit system fostered. Taxes were allowed to go delinquent-in fact,
direct taxes were frequently not levied,-borrowing was freely indulged in
1994] 1317
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Arthur T. Hadley32 analyzed the most common complaints
against railroads in the latter part of the nineteenth centmy,
and he concluded that there had been an enormous waste of
capital spent on unnecessary railroads. Hadley estimated that
of the 30,000 miles of railroads built between 1880-1882, less
than half were necessary to the development of the country. He
concluded that railroads were constructed in a manner calculat-
ed to put money in the hands of builders, rather than to serve
the interests of the public.'
Philadelphia was a case in point. "Excessive subscriptions of
stock by the state and the incautious outlay of public funds ...
were the two mistakes which made fraud by private promoters
possible." '4 The Directors of the Northwestern Railroad Compa-
ny, after faking a large portion of the required private sub-
scription in order to obtain funds from Philadelphia and other
localities, distributed $22,000 to themselves as compensation
and voted to release their treasurer from the responsibility for
accounting for private funds which that had been collected but
never invested. 5
The public perception that governments' dealings with rail-
roads was rife with corruption should not be ignored. Public
outcry of this nature led to the adoption of state constitutional
debt limitation and lending of credit provisions.s As early as
1850, A.F. Morrison, an Indiana State Representative, ex-
pressed strong objections to the "system of internal improve-
to pay the ordinary running expenses of the governments, and debts
when due were pushed on into the future by the act of refunding. These
practices opened the door for corruption among city officials ....
Id. (footnotes omitted); See also Waldron, supra note 22, at 41 ("Th[e] optimism [that
the profits of railroads would be sufficient to retire the public debt was] unfounded in
many instances. Some roads were never started; others were inadequately capitalized;
in the speculative climate which prevailed, there was much mismanagement of funds,
excessive cost of construction, and inadequate planning of roadbed, routes and mar-
kets.").
32. Mr. Hadley was the President of Yale University and the author of RAIROAD
TRANSPORTATION: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAWS (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1885).
33. Arthur T. Hadley, Railroad Abuses at Home and Abroad, in THE NEW
PRINCETON REV. 355-65 (New York, A.C. Armstrong & Son 1886).
34. William Smith, I HAZARDS REGISTER 410 (1828).
35. County of Lawrence v. North-Western R.R., 32 Pa. 144, 149-50 (1858).
36. See Rubin, supra note 13 at 156-61.
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ments" that oppressed the populace with excessive taxes. 7 He
refused to sanction the state as a partner with private enter-
prise. He stated that public involvement with private corpora-
tions usually resulted in a public detriment because "corpora-
tions always labor and scheme for their individual benefit
which is always antagonistic to the interests of the people."'
It was against this historical backdrop of over-burdened state
and local debt, widespread corruption, and fraud, that the Public
Purpose Doctrine was adopted. The doctrine was initially pro-
nounced in Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia9 and became a
dominant factor in limiting the power of the government to tax
and spend.
The economic and political conditions that gave rise to the
public's mistrust of government expenditures resemble present
day conditions. Currently, government is heavily burdened by
37. DEBATES OF INDIANA CONVENTION 651-52 (1851).
38. Id. at 652. Morrison said:
I will state to the Convention that they will generally find my
votes and my voice given to sustain the interest of the people against
any course of policy which will permit corporations to filch from the
people their rights which they can never get back again .... Our peo-
ple are to this day ground down by most oppressive taxes, which the
system of internal improvements of that year have inflicted upon
them;-Better called a system of oppression inflicted by the representa-
tives of the people as they call themselves, in the Legislature, by means
of a regular system of log rolling and now why should gentlemen wish to
place a power so dangerous to the people again at the disposal of the
legislature? ...
It is well known how these schemes are got along in the Legisla-
ture. Corporations are always well represented there, and the people
have no knowledge of what is going on until they are entrapped by
them. What right has the State of Indiana to become a partner with any
speculation? She has no more right to do this, than she has a right to
form a regular co-partnership with a merchant or manufacturer in any
speculation looking to a profitable result ....
I voted for the amendment of the gentleman from Tippecanoe be-
cause I think the same principle ought to extend to the counties which
we are about establishing for the state. There is no justice in the princi-
ple that the property or the money of the people should be taken to
make profits for corporations. I shall be found constantly voting against
any proposition to connect the interests of the people with the interests
of the corporations for the reason that corporations always labor and
scheme for their individual benefit which is always antagonistic to the
interest of the people.
DEBATES OF INDiANA CONVENTION 651-52 (1850-1851).
39. 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
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debt and the public's confidence in our governmental officials is
correspondingly low.
III. CONCEPTUAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE PUBLIC PURPOSE
DOCTRINE
Before examining the courts' interpretation and application of
the Public Purpose Doctrine as a limitation on the government's
ability to appropriate tax dollars, it is important to describe
earlier concepts proposing similar constraints on government
spending. An examination of the early conceptual models dem-
onstrates that limits must be imposed on the government's
authority to disburse public funds.
It is axiomatic that in order for government to exist, it usual-
ly must extract some portion of the wealth of its people. This is
the power of taxation. The people accord their government this
right based on the assumption that the funds exacted will only
be spent for the benefit of the public." This idea was common
among European philosophers in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries.
Montesquieu said "li]n order for these revenues to work one
must consider the necessities of the state and the necessities of
the citizens. One must not take from the real needs of the
people for the imaginary needs of the state."4'
40. See Waldron, supra note 22, at 2 (emphasis added). "The objectives or pur-
poses of taxation must be public, rather than the gratification of desires of any nar-
row privileged segment of the people." Id.
41. Montesquieu, Of The Public Revenues, in THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Book 13, ch. I
213 (Anne M. Cohlcr Vattel et al. eds. & trans., 1989) Vattel reiterated Montesqueu's
concerns:
A sovereign who possesses the power of imposing taxes upon his people
should be careful not to regard the revenues therefrom as his own pri-
vate property. He should never lose sight of the end for which that pow-
er has been entrusted to him. The Nation desired to enable him to pro-
vide in his wisdom for the needs of the State. If he diverts those reve-
nues to other uses, if he spends them to indulge himself in luxury and
pleasures, or to satiate the greed of his mistresses and favorites, we
make bold to assert to those sovereigns who can still grasp the truth
that such a one is not less guilty, nay a thousand times more so, than
an individual who uses another's property to satisfy his immoral pas-
sions. The fact that injustice may go unpunished does not make it the
less shameful.
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State constitutions in the colonies also expressed the princi-
ple that government was for the benefit of the entire communi-
ty.' The motivating force behind this philosophy was the be-
lief that it was necessary "to erect some barrier between the
taxing authority and the private right to property."' Colonial
America resolved this issue by creating a representative legisla-
ture which, at the time, was deemed to be sufficient protection
of private property interests. Professor Waldron theorized that
since legislatures were thought to be adequately representative,
the American courts commonly ruled that the legislature had
unmitigated taxing power in the absence of express constitu-
tional provisions." Thus, in McCulloch v. Maryland,45 the
United States Supreme Court stated:
The people of a state, therefore, give to their government a
right of taxing themselves and their property, and as the
exigencies of government cannot be limited, they prescribe
no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on
the interests of the legislator and on the influence of the
constituent over their representative, to guard them against
its abuse.48
By the middle of the nineteenth century, private property
interests were subject to ever-increasing taxes to pay off mas-
sive public debt. It was at this time that judicial challenges to
the legislature's authority to incur debt for other than public
purposes began to be asserted.
THE LAW OF NATIONs 243 (Fenwick trans., 1758, Carnegie Institution Classics of Int'l
Law ed., 1916).
42. See MD. CONST. art. I (1776); MASS. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1780); N.J. CONsT.
pmbl. (1776); PA. CoNsT. art. V (1776); VT. CONsT. pmbl. (1777); VA. CONsT. § 3
(1776).
43. Waldron, supra note 22, at 4.
44. Id.
45. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
46. I& at 428.
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IV. JuDiciAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE
Even though the "first clear-cut statement of the [Public Pur-
pose] Doctrine"' is usually attributed to Justice Jeremiah
Black in the case of Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia," the
tenor of the doctrine "had been performed by other verbal for-
mulas and legal concepts" in earlier cases. 9 "The view that
individuals possess some natural or inalienable right to private
property; and that protection of this right is both the reason
for, and a fundamental limitation upon organized government,
was the central proposition advanced by those challenging par-
ticular exercises of taxation or spending by government."0
Giddings v. Brown,5' decided in Massachusetts colony in
1657, almost two centuries prior to Sharpless, involved the
seizure of pewter owned by taxpayer Giddings after he failed to
pay a tax in support of a parsonage.52 Giddings brought an
action for damages, but the Salem general court found the tax
valid for "necessary, publicke town charges, viz. honourable
maintenance of the ministry, which the law requires in
generall, but leaves to each towne to determine and apply in
particular, suitable to their owne condition."" Even though
judicial review of tax legislation was not common until the mid-
nineteenth century, Professor Waldron asserts that Giddings
"stands at the head of a line of litigation involving the scope of
local fiscal powers with respect to ... necessary charges [a
concept] which explored many of the essential elements of the
Public Purpose Doctrine." "
In 1692, Massachusetts provincial legislation, mirroring early
colonial law, defined the authority of local government to assess
inhabitants "for the maintenance and support of the ministry,
schools, the poor, and for defraying other necessary charges
47. McAllister, supra note 8, at 141.
48. 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
49. Waldron, supra note 22, at 7.
50. Id. at 9.
51. See 2 THE HUTCHINSON PAPERS 1, 1-25 (Prince Society ed., 1865).
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id. at 22.
54. Waldron, supra note 22, at 11.
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arising within said town."55 The provision relating to necessary
charges was reenacted in 1785."s Subsequent cases employed
the term "necessary charges" as a limiting device with respect
to the power of the local authority to tax. In Bangs v. Snow,7
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a parish
tax levy used to promote incorporation of the parish as a town
was invalid because it was not a charge necessarily connected
with granted local powers.58 This construction of local authori-
ty "had been so uniformly holden in the judicial courts" that
the court interrupted counsel's argument and awarded damages
for trespass in a tax seizure." In Spaulding v. City of
Lowell,0 the court had to determine the scope of "necessary
charges" in connection with the legality of a town vote of funds
and levy of a tax for construction of a public marketplace. Chief
Justice Shaw stated that the court was "not at all prepared" to
discover town authority "to raise and appropriate money for
general objects" or to discover in the term "other necessary
charges" any "new, substantive power of taxation."6' To do this
would be "letting in all the mischiefs, arising from an indefinite
and arbitrary power of a majority to bind a minority, to an
unlimited extent."62 The court also recognized that custom and
usage could be used as a guide in determining appropriate town
expenditures. Appropriations based on usage "founded on the
convenience and necessities of the inhabitants," and later recog-
nized and confirmed by statute, would be allowed as a proper
"prudential concern" of the town.'
In 1837, the town of Biddeford, Maine voted to distribute its
shares of the 1836 federal treasury surplus "according to fami-
55. 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY § 6 at
66 (2d sess. 1692) (emphasis added).
56. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 75, § 7 (1785). Both these acts also used the term
"Prudential Affairs" which was also construed as limiting the authority of local gov-
ernment to expend tax dollars.
57. 1 Mass. 181 (1804).
58. Id. at 187-90.
59. Id- at 190; see also Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272 (1816) (stating that
"necessary charges" under a 1785 statute did not include payment of additional wages
to town militia).
60. 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 71 (1839).
61. Id. at 76.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 77-78.
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lies."" The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, interpreting a stat-
ute identical to the 1785 Massachusetts statute, denied an
assumpsit for a share of the distribution, finding that the dis-
tribution was "entirely unauthorized by the language of any
statute [and would violate the] principles of moral justice.""5
For if the right to assess and collect money is without limit,
it would not be difficult to continue the process of collection
and division until the whole property held by the citizens of
the town had passed into, and out of the treasury ....
Such a construction would be destructive of the security
and safety of individual property; and subversive of individ-
ual industry and exertion."
The aforementioned statutes and cases clearly speak the
language of public purpose. Substituting the term "public pur-
pose" for either "prudential concerns" or "necessary charges"
would not have altered the context in which the limitation of
the power of government to tax was discussed. These conceptu-
al precedents to the Public Purpose Doctrine also support the
proposition that current government expenditures should be
carefully scrutinized to insure they fulfill public purposes.
V. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT LITIGATION AND THE PUBLIC
PURPOSE DOCTRINE
A. The Law at Mid-Centwy (1850)
By 1850, three years before Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadel-
phia,67 internal improvement litigation was common. Many of
the cases concerned the power of the governmental entity to
provide railroad subsidies. The subsidies usually took the form
of subscription of stock in railroad corporations. In reaction to
the panic of 1837 and subsequent dramatic increases in state
and local debt, constitutional debt limitation provisions were
passed in several states by 1 8 5 0 .' Yet, there was no higher
64. Hooper v. Emory, 14 Me. 375, 375 (1837).
65. Id. at 379-80.
66. Id. at 380.
67..21 Pa. 147 (1853).
68. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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court decision prior to 1853 which held it unconstitutional for
the state to delegate to local entities the power to tax to sub-
scribe to stock in companies constructing internal improve-
ments. Also, privately owned and operated canals and turnpikes
were readily analogized to roads and therefore entitled to public
financial support.69 Generally, attorneys who argued that there
was an implied constitutional limitation to the legislative power
to tax were rebuffed by justices who demanded that such limi-
tations be explicit.7 °
B. The Sharpless Case
As mentioned previously, the Sharpless case is the most
significant case in the public purpose era, initially pronouncing
the doctrine in the context of limiting the government's spend-
ing power.71
On May 9, 1853, the Pennsylvania Legislature authorized the
City of Philadelphia to subscribe to 10,000 shares of stock in
the Hempfield Railroad Company. It also gave the city the
authority to borrow and provide for repayment of principal and
interest.72 Oddly enough, the nearest point of the line to Phil-
adelphia was to be more than three hundred miles away. The
city had previously subscribed to four million dollars of stock in
the Pennsylvania Railroad and had determined that the
Hempfield feeder line would establish a valuable connection
into the Ohio River Valley.73 William Sharpless sought an in-
junction against the subscription from the state supreme court.
The importance of this case was illustrated by the fact that
both sides were represented by prominent members of the
Pennsylvania Bar.74
69. Waldron, supra note 22, at 61-62.
70. See, e.g., Bridgeport v. Housantonuc R.R., 15 Conn. 475 (1843).
71. Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853).
72. The pertinent section of the act is reprinted in the Sharpless opinion. Id. at
150.
73. Id.
74. Mr. Sharpless was represented by Benjamin Brewster, Garrick Mallery and
Thomas Williams. Brewster had been the Attorney General of Pennsylvania just after
the Civil War and gained his greatest prominence as President Arthur's Attorney
General and Prosecutor of the Star Route Postal Frauds in 1881-1884. 2 DICTIONARY
OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 26 (A. Johnson & D. Malone eds., 1958). Garrick Mallery
had just been admitted to the Bar. However, he subsequently abandoned the law for
a military and scientific career and became a leading authority on Indian pictography.
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The presiding judge, Chief Justice Jeremiah S. Black of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, had been elected to the court in
1857 and was subsequently appointed Attorney General of the
United States by President Buchanan.75 Black began his opin-
ion by focusing on the economic effect the granting of the in-
junction sought by Sharpless would have on the current bond-
holders who were counting on the completion of the railway
and on the economy of Pennsylvania:
We cannot award the injunction asked for, without declar-
ing that all such bonds are as destitute of legal validity as
so much blank parchment. Besides the deadly blow it would
give to our improvements, and the disastrous effect of it on
the private fortunes of many honest men, at home and
abroad, it would seriously wound the credit and character of
the state, and do much to lessen the influence of our insti-
tutions on the public mind of the world.76
Justice Black, however, also acknowledged that the power of
government to incur debt in order to subscribe in railroad stock
would bring injury to the people at large." Nevertheless, Jus-
6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 222 (A. Johnson & D. Malone eds., 1961).
Thomas Williams was a prominent Pittsburgh attorney who voluntarily presented
argument against the constitutionality of the acts. He also was a founder of the Re-
publican Party in Pennsylvania, a Congressman, and a House manager of the Im-
peachment of President Johnson. Waldron, supra note 22, at 69.
The city was represented by John Meredith Reed and George Mifflin Dallas.
Reed had been a United States District Judge and was elected to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in 1858. 8 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 427-28 (A. Johnson &
D. Malone eds., 1963). George Mifflin Dallas had been Vice President of the United
States during President Polk's administration. He had served as Ambassador to Rus-
sia and Great Britain. 3 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 38 (A. Johnson & D.
Malone eds., 1959).
75. See WILIAM N. BRIGANCE, JEREMIAH SULLIVAN BLACK, A DEFENDER OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE TEN COMMANDMENTS (1934). After returning to private life
Black had an illustrious career as counsel in Ex Parte Mulligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 1
(1866) where he argued for civilian rights against military rule and justice. He also
appeared opposite John Archibald Campbell in reargument of the Slaughterhouse
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
76. 21 Pa. 147, 158-59 (1853).
77. Id. at 159.
If the power exists, it will continue to be exerted, and generally it will
be used under the influence of those who are personally interested, and
who do not see or care for the ultimate injury it may bring upon the
people at large. Men feel acutely what affects themselves as individuals,
and are but slightly influenced by public considerations. What each per-
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tice Black concluded that the court "can declare an Act of As-
sembly void, only when it violates the constitution clearly, pal-
pably, plainly; and in such manner as to leave no doubt or
hesitation on our minds."" Since no constitutional language
"expressly or by clear implication forbids the legislature to
authorize subscriptions by a city to the capital stock of a com-
pany incorporated for the purpose of making a railroad," the
petitioner's action failed.79
Ironically, Justice Black did not end the opinion with his
constitutionally interpretive observation. Instead, he introduced
the reservation that formed the basis of the Public Purpose
Doctrine: "I do not mean to assert that every act which the
legislature may choose to call a tax law is constitutional."0
He continued, and in express terms set forth the Public Pur-
pose Doctrine:
Neither has the legislature any constitutional right to cre-
ate a public debt, or to lay a tax, or to authorize any mu-
nicipal corporation to do it, in order to raise funds for a
mere private purpose. No such authority passed to the As-
sembly by the general grant of legislative power. This
would not be legislation. Taxation is a mode of raising reve-
son wins by his enterprise, is all his own; the public losses are shared
by thousands. The selfish passion is intensified by the prospect of imme-
diate gain; private speculation becomes ardent, energetic, and daring,
while public spirit--cold and timid at the best--grows feebler still when
the danger is remote. Under these circumstances it is easy to see where
this ultra-enterprising spirit will end. It carried the state to the verge of
financial ruin; it has produced revulsions of trade and currency in every
commercial country;, it is tending now, and here, to the bankruptcy of
cities and counties.
Id.
78. Id. at 164.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 168.
The whole of a public burden cannot be thrown on a single individual,
under pretence of taxing him, nor can one country be taxed to pay the
debt of another, nor one portion of the state to pay the debts of the
whole state. These things are not excepted from the powers of the legis-
lature, because they did not pass to the Assembly by the general grant
of legislative power. A prohibition was not necessary. An Act of Assem-
bly, commanding or authorizing them to be done, would not be a law,
but an attempt to pronounce a judicial sentence, order or decree.
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nue for public purposes. When it is prostituted to objects in
no way connected with the public interests or welfare, it
ceases to be taxation, and becomes plunder.81
Having established that the taxing power of the legislature is
limited to public purposes, Justice Black applied the doctrine to
the facts of the case. Although acknowledging that the proceeds
from the sale of the shares would end up in the hands of a
private corporation, he stated that it was "not on the nature or
character of the person or corporation" who is employed to
achieve a public purpose." Rather, it is the "ultimate use, pur-
pose and object for which the fund is raised" that determines
public purpose." Accordingly, the ultimate object of the expen-
diture determined public purpose, not the means used to
achieve that object.
Black then concluded that the construction of a railway was
for a public purpose. "A Railroad is a public highway for the
public benefit, and the right of a corporation to exact a uni-
form, reasonable, stipulated toll from those who pass over it,
does not make its main use a private one."' Black stated that
the state's duty does not stop with the establishment of those
institutions necessary for the existence of government: "To aid,
encourage, and stimulate commerce ... is [also] a duty of the
sovereign .... ."'
81. I& at 168-69.
82. Id. at 169.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 169-70.
It is a grave error to suppose that the duty of a state stops with the
establishment of those institutions which are necessary to the existence
of government; such as those for the administration of justice, the preser-
vation of the peace, and the protection of the country from foreign ene-
mies; schools, colleges and institutions, for the promotion of the arts and
sciences, which are not absolutely necessary, but highly useful, are also
entitled to a public patronage enforced by law. To aid, encourage, and
stimulate commerce, domestic and foreign, is a duty of the sovereign, as
plain and as universally recognized as any other .... Canals, bridges,
roads, and other artificial means of passage and transportation from one
part of the country to the other, have been made by the sovereign power,
and at the public expense, in every civilized state of ancient and modem
times.
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There can be no question that Sharpless provided significant
judicial support for governmental expenditures in aid of private
enterprise constructing internal improvements. However, the
impact of Sharpless must be tempered by the consideration that
its scope was confined to aid to corporations operating in one
particular sector of the economy. As a result, Sharpless provid-
ed scant precedent for courts considering public aid to private
corporations doing business outside the internal improvement
area.
It should be noted that judiciaries in three states registered
spirited dissents to the overwhelming number of rulings in
other states validating municipal stock subscription in railroads.
The dissenters were led by such imminent jurists as John F.
Dillon of Iowa and Thomas M. Cooley of Michigan."
In an 1859 Iowa case, Stokes v. County of Scott, 7 petitioners
challenged local subscriptions to railroads under a code section
that courts had previously employed to sustain such subscrip-
tions." The court stated that irrespective of how much rail-
roads might develop resources and increase general prosperity,
the railroads are similar to mills and manufacturing establish-
ments for which "it would scarcely be claimed that a county has
the inherent right, in its corporate capacity, to tax the peo-
ple."89 This view was buttressed by Chief Justice John F.
Dillon in Hanson v. Vernon" where the court was called upon
to decide the constitutionality of legislation enacted specifically
to allow localities to tax for railroad aid." In striking down
the legislation as unconstitutional, Justice Dillon relied on sev-
eral propositions: (1) the legislature has no right to tax citizens
and hand the money over to a private, for-profit organization;'
86. THOMAs M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (1871) was a milestone in
American Constitutional Law. JOHN F. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1881) was
a pioneer legal treatise.
87. 10 Iowa 166 (1859).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 172-73; see also State ex rel. Burlington & Missouri R.R. v. County of
Wapello, 13 Iowa 388, 405 (1862) (stating that railroads are essentially private, not
public and that "county revenue must go to the county treasurer where it would be
under control of a county's agents").
90. 27 Iowa 28 (1869).
91. Id.
92. Id at 40-41.
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(2) the Sharpless decision, allowing such aid, had been reached
under the influence of fourteen million dollars in debts previ-
ously subscribed and under the influence of Chief Justice Gib-
son, whose "extreme notions" of the extent of legislative power
would "practically invest the legislature with despotic power";93
(3) the legislative enactment was "in fact, a coercive contribu-
tion in favor of private railway corporations and violative [of
the due process provisions of the federal constitution]";' (4)
taxes are contributions demanded for the use of government
and not for private uses;95 and (5) whatever "material prosperi-
ty" that results from the railroad construction would be "a mere
incident of the business [which was organized] solely to make
money for... stockholders."96 Finally, Justice Dillon put forth
the proposition that future courts would cite as precedent in
striking down aid to private corporations in other sectors of the
economy. Dillon stated that sanctioning such legislation 'e-
cause of the incidental advantage to the community" would "un-
settle the foundation of private rights."97 He reasoned that if
the citizen and his property might be taxed for "incidental ad-
vantage to the community, "who, indeed, could define the logical
boundaries to this doctrine? . . . . [Algriculture, commerce, the
mechanic arts, [indeed] ... every department of labor and ev-
ery industrial pursuit" would be involved since they all advance
the "public prosperity.""8
In Michigan, two years after publication of his treatise Con-
stitutional Limitations, Justice Thomas M. Cooley led the ma-
jority in opposing public financing of railroads in refusing to
grant mandamus to compel the issue of township bonds as a
loan to the railroad.99 While echoing many of Chief Justice
Dillon's themes, Justice Cooley also stated that an indirect and
incidental benefit to the public through the enhancement of
values could not sustain taxation because such "incidental ben-
efit which any enterprise may bring to the public, has never
93. Id. at 44-45.
94. Id. at 45.
95. Id. at 48.
96. Id. at 53.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 58-59 (emphasis added).
99. People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. v. Township Bd., 20 Mich. 452 (1870).
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been recognized as sufficient of itself to bring the object within
the sphere of taxation.""'
Justice Cooley also attacked the 'prevalent proposition that
because railroads enjoyed eminent domain powers for public
use, they must therefore be public objects to sustain taxation
for their benefit. He stated that the grant of eminent domain
powers to railroads was a "considerable modification" of com-
mon law principles, and a mere "convenient fiction" the courts
had adopted from "overriding public necessity."'0 ' The law in
the case of railroads had considered need rather than means of
accomplishment. But if an analogy existed between eminent
domain and another power, "it is much nearer akin to that of
the public police than to that of taxation."0"
Finally, in a statement that present day judges would do well
to observe, Justice Cooley, in response to the assertion that his
decision was contrary to the weight of authority in other states,
opined that mere repetition of decisions added little to the au-
thority of the first case in the line.' Furthermore, the Michi-
gan Court was unembarrassed by prior decision and could settle
the matter on principle.'
VI. PUBLIC AID TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
How does public aid to such private corporations as Mercedes
Benz, the Chicago White Sox, and the Portland Trailblazers fit
within the context of the previous discussion of public purpose?
The answer is that court rulings regarding the Public Purpose
Doctrine in the context of internal improvement litigation were
radically different than the conclusion drawn by the courts
regarding aid to private corporations operating in other sectors
of the economy. As illustrated below, with the exception of the
ambivalence of the courts concerning aid to agriculture, the
courts overwhelmingly concluded that aid to private enterprise
100. Id. at 488.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 492.
104. Id. at 493.
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doing business outside the internal improvement sector was
prohibited.
It is important to reiterate that the foundation of the intense
debate over aid to railroads was whether they, as private corpo-
rations, were the proper entities to perform what was almost
unanimously considered a public purpose: the construction of
internal improvements, specifically railways. The construction of
internal improvements'0 5 was historically considered a public
duty, so there was no question that the object of the expendi-
ture of tax dollars was for a public purpose.
But the operations engaged in by many other types of indus-
try were not impressed with the imprimatur of public purpose.
Furthermore, in light of the disastrous experience with rail-
roads, public attitudes changed from generally encouraging
government subsidies to encouraging private enterprise and per-
sonal initiative: "General disillusionment with the fruits of
governmental enterprise in the earlier part of the [nineteenth]
century undoubtedly played a part in the development of this
attitude. And the excesses of railroad finance had borne bitter
fruit in public bankruptcy and debt repudiation.""8
Professor Waldron has asserted that "[t]he proposition that
private interests might not enjoy public largesse was a major
corollary implicit in the commonly accepted argument that
railroads might benefit from public funds because they fur-
thered public purposes."' 7 In 1871, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine expressly adopted this proposition in Opinion of
the Justices.' This work is deemed to be the first widely rec-
ognized judicial pronouncement on the subject regarding aid to
private corporations operating outside the internal improvement
area."9 The Maine House of Representatives asked the court
whether it might enable towns to "assist individuals or corpo-
rations to establish or carry on manufacturing of various kinds"
105. Prior to railroad construction, the term "internal improvements" involved, inter
alia, the construction of schools, jails, and libraries. See Charles F. Chamberlayne,
The Sugar Bounties, 5 HARV. L. REV. 320, 324 (1891-92).
106. Waldron, supra note 22, at 234.
107. Id.
108. 58 Me. 590 (1871).
109. Waldron, supra note 22, at 235.
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by donations or loans of public fimds." Justice Appleton an-
swered in the negative, responding that taxation must be for a
public purpose and that the proposed legislation is "limited by
and embrace[s] what is special and private, thereby excluding
what is municipal, governmental or public."' Justice Appleton
also discussed whether benefit to the community resulting from
the operations of the manufacturer satisfied the public purpose
requirements:
The general benefit to the community resulting from every
description of well-directed labor is of the same character,
whatever may be the branch of industry upon which it is
expended. All useful laborers, no matter what the field of
labor, serve the State by increasing the aggregate of its
products,--its wealth.. There is nothing of a public nature
any more entitling the manufacturer to public gifts than
the sailor, the mechanic, the lumberman, or the farmer."
Justice Dickerson was even more explicit in his opposition to
such legislation. Taking a slightly different approach than Jus-
tice Appleton, he began with the proposition that the legislature
has the authority to enact laws which are for the "benefit of
the people of the state.""'
Acknowledging that the term "benefit to the people" was
"broad and comprehensive," he stated:
Such are the laws providing for the survey of lumber...
the establishment of local tribunals, sanitary and police
regulations, public parks and public libraries .... It is not
the purpose of these laws to confer pecuniary benefit upon
private individuals, or increase the value of private proper-
ty, or furnish employment for the people, in a particular
district, but it is to subserve the public convenience and
promote the general welfare.""
110. 58 Me. at 590 (1871).
111. Id. at 592. Justice Appleton recast the question as follows: "It is true the
inquiry is, whether the legislature can authorize a town by a major or any vote to
give away the property of an unwilling minority to an individual or manufacturing
corporation whom or which such majority may select as donees." Id. at 592-93.
112. Id. at 593.
113. Id. at 601.
114. Id. at 602.
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Regarding the proposed legislation, he stated that its "direct
purpose [is] private in its character; it is to increase the means
and improve the property of some, and furnish employment to
some, while the benefit, if any, to the public is only reflective,
incidental or secondary.""'
Responding to the argument that if aid were not extended,
certain enterprises either could not continue to operate or
would not settle in the state, Dickerson responded with the rhe-
torical inquiry: "But does the inability of A., to carry on or
establish manufacturing, afford any constitutional ground for
taxing B. to help A do so?""'
Finally, in answer to the contention that manufacturers were
no different from railroads, Dickerson stated "[r]ailroads are
manifestly the great public convenience and necessary not on
the ground that they incidentally [benefit the country or] in-
crease the local value of private property, . . . [but because
their] primary purpose is . . . a public one [: to foster the] in-
tercommunication between remote sections of the country as
public highways.""
17
The Opinion of the Justices set forth the parameters on how
aid to private corporations operating outside the internal im-
provement sector would be viewed. Such private corporations
were not deemed to be carrying on business for a public pur-
pose. Whether their business operations might result in some
incidental benefit to the public was irrelevant, as such benefit
did not provide a constitutional authority for public aid. In
addition, employing "benefit to the public" as a judicial
standard effectively eliminated the impact of the Public Purpose
Doctrine as a limitation on the spending power. Finally, com-
115. Id. at 603.
116. Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 605.
Not only is the public character of railroad corporations established by
their office, as public highways, and by the grant of the right of eminent
domain to them, but it further appears from the various legislative en-
actments in regard to the construction of these roads, the provisions for
the safety of the public, the constant supervision to be exercised over
their management by the railroad commissioners of the State, and the
penalties imposed for their neglect or violation of these regulations.
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paring manufacturers with railroads in the context of public aid
proved futile because the great weight of judicial authority had
considered railroads to be performing a public function."'
A somewhat startling example of how the attitude of the
justices in Maine was reflected in other states is the case of
Lowell v. Boston." In 1862, a fire destroyed a part of Boston,
and in response, the state legislature authorized the city to
borrow $20 million for reconstruction loans to affected property
owners. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court enjoined
the bond issue as being beyond the taxing power of the legisla-
ture because the issue did not concern the public welfare:
The promotion of the interests of individuals, either in re-
spect of property or business, although it may result inci-
dentally in the advancement of the public welfare, is, in its
essential character, a private and not a public object. How-
ever certain and great the resulting good to the general
public, it does not, by reason of its comparative importance,
cease to be incidental.20
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court examined the
Public Purpose Doctrine in the case of Loan Association v.
Topeka." This case involved legislation authorizing Kansas
cities and counties to issue bonds, the proceeds of which would
be donated to private corporations to build bridges and to aid
railroads, water power development, and other internal im-
provements. The Court stated that there could "be no lawful
tax which is not laid for a public purpose."' In reviewing the
Kansas legislation, the Court had "no difficulty in holding
that... [the proposed aid] is not [for] such a public purpose as
we have been considering."' The Court also dismissed the
118. Opinion of the Justices was followed by the case of Allen v. Jay, in which the
Supreme Court of Maine struck down a proposed bond issue, the proceeds of which
were to be loaned to a private firm. Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1872). Professor
Waldron has characterized the 1871 and 1872 opinions as "the most ingenious in the
whole case literature of public purpose, in their invocation of economic consider-
ations." Waldron supra note 22, at 241.
119. 111 Mass. 454 (1873).
120. Id. at 461.
121. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
122. Id. at 664 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 665.
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public benefit assertion by ruling that employing such criteria
would remove any limitation on the power to tax.'
Loan Association has been characterized as the first case in
which the United States Supreme Court recognized the Public
Purpose Doctrine.' "It has been ranked with Cooley's Salem
opinion, his treatises and the Lowell and Sharpless cases as a
definitive proclamation of the Doctrine."'
VII. SUMMARY
Contrasting the current application of the Public Purpose
Doctrine with its original intent, it is apparent that the rule is
an ineffective means of limiting a legislature's spending power.
Judicial inability to fashion consistent guidelines concerning the
application of the doctrine has contributed to its ineffectiveness.
Perhaps the problem is with the conceptual dilemmas of the
rule. Over a century ago, Justice Ladd of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court recognized some of the difficulties in applying
the doctrine. He stated that the courts, in determining the
public purpose of tax legislation, "pass upon the same question
as that decided by the legislature.., and they must determine
it in the same way [that] the legislature ha[s] done, simply by
124. Id.
If it be said that a benefit results to the local public of a town by estab-
lishing manufactures, the same may be said of any other business or
pursuit which employs capital or labor. The merchant, the mechanic, the
innkeeper, the banker, the builder, the steamboat owner are equally
promoters of the public good, and equally deserving the aid of the citi-
zens by forced contributions. No line can be drawn in favor of the manu-
facturer which would not open the coffers of the public treasury to the
importunities of two-thirds of the business men of the city or town.
125. See McAllister, supra note 8, at 147.
126. Waldron, supra note 22, at 251. Prohibition of aid to private enterprise was
also applicable to mixed public and private enterprises. See Opinion of the Justices,
91 N.E. 405 (Mass. 1910) (invoking the Lowell decision against a municipal plan for
development of the Boston Harbor area and stating that management and use of the
project "to promote the interests of the merchants or traders who might occupy it,
and to furnish better facilities for doing business and making profits" would not be
for a public purpose); Coates v. Campbell, 35 N.W. 366 (Minn. 1887) (enjoining village
construction of a power dam across the Mississippi River); Attorney v. Eau Claire, 37
Wis. 400 (1875) (enjoining construction of a dam and water power facilities by a city).
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the exercise of reason and judgment."' Ladd also stated very
few expenditures were per se public or private because that
determination rested in social, political and economic experience
and was "essentially a conclusion of fact and public policy."M
Since it is difficult to devise a coherent judicial framework
within which the Public Purpose Doctrine can be applied to
limit government expenditures, it is necessary to look to other
means of achieving this goal. One alternative is to require that
in situations where goods and services are provided to the pub-
lic, all government expenditures must be channelled through
nonprofit entities. That is, unless the government decides to
provide the good or service itself, the entity providing funding
should be nonprofit.
VIH. A NOT-FOR-PROFrr SOLUTION
A. Preliminary Comments
Why propose a not-for-profit solution? The answer is simple:
attempts to limit government spending by use of the Public
Purpose Doctrine have created problems concerning judicial ap-
plication and have fostered a climate of greed, political payoffs,
and runaway public debt.' The probability that such a cli-
mate would exist in a not-for-profit context is minimal. The
elimination of the profit motive would substantially reduce the
incentive to use money to influence political decisionmaking.
For example, the current craze by the states to attract gam-
bling has resulted in gaming interests making large campaign
contributions to legislators. In Texas, casino companies spent
between an estimated $1 million and $1.8 million during the
1993 legislative session in lobbying for riverboat casino gam-
bling. These amounts include a $100,000 contribution by a
major investor in United Gaming to Governor George Bush, Jr.,
and a $105,000 contribution by a Dallas developer to former
127. Perry v. Keene, 56 N.H. 514, 532 (1876).
128. Id. at 533.
129. The Public Purpose Doctrine has been used as a tool to expand government
spending when courts employ it as an exemption from state constitutional provisions
prohibiting aid to private corporations. See Rubin, supra note 13, at 161-66.
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Governor Ann Richards. 3 ° It is inconceivable that such large
campaign contributions would not influence a legislator's deci-
sion that public subsidies to gaming interests serve a public
purpose.
Let us also examine the conceptual dilemma in which Gale
Norton, the Attorney General of Colorado, found herself re-
sponding to questions presented by the President of the State
Senate regarding a proposal to give United Airlines massive tax
breaks as an incentive to locate an aircraft maintenance facility
in Colorado.13 ' The proposal would grant United Airlines as
much as $609 million in tax credits over a thirty-year period.
In determining whether such a subsidy served a public pur-
pose, the opinion stated that a distinction should be made be-
tween two judicial philosophies: (1) a "judicial activist" ap-
proach, which "utilizes current practical realities to interpret
the constitution with modern needs and understandings,""2
thereby allowing virtually any aid to a private corporation as
long as a public purpose is stated in the legislation; and (2) a
"strict construction" view that the state constitution, which
contains provisions prohibiting such aid,1 3 is the "overriding
document" which, in the Attorney General's opinion, creates a
structure of fairness and objectivity."M The Attorney General
also stated that adherence to constitutional mandates prevents
"favoritism and whim."35 In spite of these strong admonitions,
Attorney General Norton concluded:
130. R.G. Ratcliffe, Politicians Winning Big Over Casinos; Gambling Firms Seek to
Influence Officials, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 8, 1994, at Al.
131. Letter to the Honorable Ted Strickland, President of the Senate, from Gale
Norton, Attorney General of Colorado (June 13, 1991) (on fie with the Attorney Gen-
eral, A-G. File N.ORL).
132. Id.
133. For example, the Colorado Constitution provides:
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, township, or school district
shall make any donation or grant to, or in aid of, or become a subscriber
to, or shareholder in any corporation or company or a joint owner with
any person, company, or corporation, public or private, in or out of the
state, except as to such ownership as may accrue to the state by escheat,
or by forfeiture, by operation or provision of law.
CoLO. CONsT. art. XI, § 2.
134. Letter, supra note 131, at 10.
135. Id.
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The proposed legislation provides aid to a private corpora-
tion that would not pass muster under the Colorado Consti-
tution as originally intended .... Nevertheless, in advising
the General Assembly, I cannot ignore the vast divergence
between the original intent of the Constitution and modem
judicial interpretation. Given the historical trends, public
purposes such as those set forth in the proposed legislation
will almost certainly pass judicial muster.l" '
The expansion of the Public Purpose Doctrine by the Attor-
ney General, in spite of her admonitory language, is the likely
result of the political pressures both she and other public offi-
cials feel when they attempt to restrict the power of their peers
to spend tax dollars in subsidizing large corporations. Thus, ef-
forts by the government in response to political pressures exert-
ed by private entities to enlarge the scope of what is a public
purpose renders the doctrine ineffective as a limitation on the
spending authority of the legislature.
B. A Specific Not-For-Profit Proposal
Initially, it should be understood that my proposal would
significantly restrict the power of public entities to subsidize
private activities. In fact, this proposal would prohibit the ex-
penditure of tax dollars to subsidize private activities unless
they are conducted by nonprofit entities. Such a government-
nonprofit framework would also have serious repercussions on
the ability of private entities to finance their activities using
public funds. These are matters with which economists and
politicians must grapple.
The types of nonprofit entities to which I refer for the deliv-
ery of public goods and services... are what have been de-
scribed as "true" nonprofits, i.e., firms formally organized as
either nonprofit corporations or charitable trusts. These organi-
zations are characterized by the fact that they are subject to a
"nondistribution constraint" that prohibits the distribution of re-
sidual earnings to individuals who exercise control over the
136. Id.
137. What is classified as a "public" good or service is a matter of legislative dis-
cretion.
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firm. A nonprofit firm offers consumers the advantage that
those who control the organization are constrained in their
ability to benefit personally from providing low-quality services;
thus, they have less incentive to take advantage of their cus-
tomers than do managers of a for-profit firm:" 8
The emphasis ... here is on the role of the nondistribution
constraint as a direct bar on opportunistic conduct on the
part of nonprofit's managers. The nondistribution constraint
might also, however, serve the same function through indi-
rect means by screening for managers who place an unusu-
ally low value on pecuniary compensation and an unusually
high value on having the organization they run produce
large quantities of services or services that are of especially
high quality.3 9
Prior to examining in detail a nonprofit paradigm, it is im-
portant to understand that there are several nonprofit alterna-
tives through which the delivery of public goods and services
can be achieved.
Initially, to appreciate the significance of the nonprofit sector,
it should be noted that in 1980, nonprofits4 ° purchased
$142.2 billion in goods and services and employed 15.3% of the
service sector workers in such fields as health care, education,
research and social services.' At that time, the nonprofit sec-
138. Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Non-Profit Organizations, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 27 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987). Burton
Wisebrod describes such firms as "public," "collective," and "trust" type nonprofits.
BURTON A. WISEBROD, THE NoN-PRoFIT ECONOMY 9-10 (1988). A "collective" nonprofit
provides services that generate sizeable, "external" benefits to those who do not help
to finance the organization's activities. This includes medical research, museums,
wildlife sanctuaries, environmental protection, and aid to the poor. Activities of collec-
tive nonprofits are virtually indistinguishable from those of governmental agencies. A
public-type "trust goods" nonprofit is exemplified by services rendered by nursing
homes, daycare centers, and blood banks. They sell their services, just as proprietary
firms do, but the services they sell are of the kind about which consumers are often
poorly informed. Some consumers may prefer to deal with a nonprofit organization
with the belief that it will take less advantage of a consumer's informational handi
cap than a for-profit seller would. See WISEBROD, supra at 10.
139. Hansmann, supra note 138, at 29 n.5.
140. The types of nonprofit organizations vary widely. Such entities as Common
Cause, March of Dimes, American Automobile Association, National Geographic Soci-
ety, hospitals, nursing homes, and trade associations can all qualify to operate as
nonprofit entities.
141. Gabriel Rudney, The Scope and Dimensions of Nonprofit Activities, in THE
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tor was the third largest sector of the United States econo-
my.' In 1993, the nonprofit sector measured $389 billion in
total expenditures.'
In considering the delivery of public goods and services
through the nonprofit sector, one must concentrate on three
major areas: (1) the type of nonprofit organization that will pro-
vide the goods and services; (2) what goods and services should
be provided; and (3) the most efficient method for providing
such goods and services.
Nonprofit organizations take the following forms: (1) inde-
pendent entities that perform traditional governmental func-
tions (i.e., school and community college districts, hospital dis-
tricts, transits districts, state colleges and housing authorities);
(2) nongovernmental public corporations (i.e., the Red Cross or
industrial accident insurance corporations); and (3) private
nonprofit entities (i.e., private colleges, museums, orchestras,
and public broadcast stations). All of these private nonprofit
entities are tax exempt and often receive public subsidies.
Additionally, the kinds of goods and services that government
purchases or provides either directly or through subsidies are
those that are (1) considered essential to the operation of gov-
ernment itself; (2) deemed essential "public services" such as
utilities, transportation, housing, health care and prisons; and
(3) described as bestowing general benefits on the community
(i.e., various subsidized economic development projects).
Finally, in deciding what is the most economically efficient
method of delivering such goods and services, one must consider
choices ranging from (1) simple governmental purchase of such
goods and services in the marketplace (with no subsidy in
price) to (2) above-market payments as a form of support for
the providing entity, (3) tax breaks, (4) credit support (loans,
industrial development bonds, guarantees), (5) use of public
facilities at reduced costs, and/or (6) direct financial subsidies
from public funds to private individuals for payment to nonprof-
it providers, as is the case in the medicare system.
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 55, 56-57 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
142. Id. at 56.
143. VRGINAm A. HODGKINSON ET AL., NONPROFIT ALMANAC 1992-93: DIMENSIONS
OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR 5 (1992).
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In light of the foregoing, it is obvious that much more work
needs to be undertaken to determine the optimum relationship
between the aforementioned alternatives. Nevertheless, the type
of government-nonprofit association that would reduce the unde-
sirable economic and political behavior described earlier in-
volves either direct financial dealings between nonprofit orga-
nizations and particular governmental agencies or nonprofits
that receive government subsidies. The key to making this type
of govefnment-nonprofit partnership work is encapsulated in
the word "accountability." The governmental entity must main-
tain sufficient control over the nonprofit organization to hold it
accountable. The ability of government to require accountability
is greatest where the form of assistance to the nonprofit is a
direct contract, loan, or grant. "It is weakest where the assis-
tance is provided to [entities] who are then free to purchase
services from providers of their choice in the market."'
The case of Kromko v. Arizona Board of Regents'45 illus-
trates the type of relationship between government and the
nonprofit entity which fulfills public purposes and reduces the
possibility of corruption. Kromko involved a challenge to the
legality of a lease transaction between a state university and a
nonprofit corporation that operated the university hospital. The
petitioner claimed that the hospital, which received an annual
appropriation from the general fund of the state, was the re-
cipient of a subsidy in violation of the Arizona Constitution
provision prohibiting government aid to corporations.' The
court ruled that the expenditure did not violate the constitu-
tion. It also stated that public funds are to be expended only
for public purposes. The court, in examining the legislative
intent supporting the enactment of Article 9, Section 7 and the
rationale for the Public Purpose Doctrine in Arizona, focused on
the level of control the state retained with respect to the hospi-
tal operation. The court noted that the Arizona Board of Re-
144. Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Gov-
ernment Nonprofit Relations, in NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 99, 106
(Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
145. 718 P.2d 478 (Ariz. 1986).
146. The Arizona Constitution states: "Neither the State, nor any county, city,
town, municipality or other subdivision of the State shall ever give or loan its credit
in the aid of, or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individ-
ual, association, or corporation.. . ." ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
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gents, a quasi-public body selected by the state legislature, de-
cides who serves on the board of directors and retains the right
of approval of any business transaction of the nonprofit that
could adversely affect the interests of the state.147 The non-
profit was also required to make semi-annual progress reports
on its financial status to the regents. No earnings of the non-
profit corporation other than the reasonable compensation for
services could be distributed to its members, directors, or offi-
cers.
In other words, [the nonprofit corporation] is an indepen-
dent corporation, free to operate in a competitive market
without the normal constraints usually placed on the state.
Nevertheless, its operations are still subject to the control
and supervision of public officials. Hence, we believe the fear
of private gain or exploitation of public funds envisioned by
the drafters of our constitution is absent .....
Thus, in' order for the government-nonprofit partnering to be
effective, government must maintain some reasonable control
over the operation of the nonprofit entity.
There are, however, other issues that must be resolved in the
government-nonprofit paradigm. While government should strive
to make its subsidized nonprofit entity accountable and effi-
cient, the nonprofit entity must resist the temptation to engage
in what Professor Salamon refers to as "philanthropic insuffi-
ciency, philanthropic particularism and philanthropic paternal-
ism,"149 all of which cause the nonprofit to place emphasis on
its wealthy nongovernmental donors to the exclusion of its less
fortunate clients. Additionally, government's interest in account-
147. Kromko, 718 P.2d at 480.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Professor Salamon describes "philanthropic insufficiency" as: "[tihe central
failing of the voluntary system as a provider of collective goods has been its inability
to generate resources on a scale that is both adequate and reliable enough to cope
with the human service problems of an advanced industrial society." Salamon, supra
note 143, at 111. He defines philanthropic particularism as "the tendency of voluntary
organizations and their benefactors to focus on particular subgroups of the popula-
tion." Id. This idea is characteristic of Catholic or Jewish relief agencies. Philanthrop-
ic paternalism is defined as an approach that "inevitably invests most of the influ-
ence over the definition of community needs in the hands of those in command of the
greatest resources." Id., at 112. This concept encompasses foundations and wealthy
owners.
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ability must be tempered by the nonprofit's need for a measure
of self-determination and independence.
Referring again to the nondistribution constraint, Hansmann
asserts that although nonprofits are subject to only minimum
policing, abuses involving managers enriching themselves at the
expense of the entity or its clients appear to be the exception
rather than the rule: "Such broad compliance with a poorly
policed constraint is presumably due to adherence to social
norms that reinforce the legal restraints on profiteering by
conditioning individual behavior even when the legal con-
straints are unlikely to be enforced."5 ' In addition, nonprofits
are viewed as more trustworthy by the consumer because the
presence of the nondistribution constraint reduces the probabili-
ty that management will make sacrifices in the quality of ser-
vices to increase financial returns. 5'
With respect to the ability of nonprofit managers to preside
over the economic and efficient delivery of public goods and
services, it has been observed that entrepreneurial activity in
the nonprofit sector is no different from that in the for-profit
area:
The thrust of the theory is that entrepreneurs of different
motivations and styles sort themselves out by industries
and economic sectors in a way that matches the preferences
of these entrepreneurs for wealth, power, and intellectual or
moral purposes, and other goals with the opportunities for
achieving these goals in different parts of the economy.
Once screened, such entrepreneurial agents are assumed to
be largely responsible for giving each sector its particular
behavioral flavor and performance characteristics.'52
In response to the suggestion that the only motivation for
entrepreneurial activity is economic gain, Vroom states: "The
evidence concerning noneconomic incentives to work is not re-
stricted to people's reports of their motivations. The existence of
'dollar-a-year men,' who work with only token economic rewards
150. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L. 835, 875
(1980).
151. Hansmann, supra note 138, at 29.
152. DENNIS R. YOUNG, IF NOT FOR PROFIT, FOR WHAT?: A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF
THE NONPROFIT SECTION BASED ON ENTREPRENEURSHP 3 (1983).
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and entrepreneurs who continue to work after having amassed
tremendous fortunes, is well known. " '
A nonprofit can also represent a politically desirable alterna-
tive to achieve public purposes if its board of directors, staff
and volunteers have roots in the constituency it serves. As a
result, it will have at least "nominal sensitivity" to political
questions exerted by its constituency.'
Finally, two more observations are worth noting. First, there
is nothing novel in the suggestion of government-nonprofit
partnering. Government support of voluntary nonprofit organi-
zations "has deep roots in American history."155 Before the
American Revolution, colonial governments established a tradi-
tion of assistance to private educational institutions such as
Harvard and Yale. 5 '
Second, the delivery of public goods and services through the
nonprofit sector resolves "the conflict that has long existed in
American political thinking between the desire for public servic-
es and hostility to the government apparatus that provides
them."' This is because the government performs a manage-
rial function but leaves a substantial degree of discretion to its
non-governmental partner. "Thus, where existing institutions
are available to carry out a function, whether it be extending
loans, providing better health care, delivering social servic-
es-they therefore have a presumptive claim and a meaningful
role in whatever public program might be established."
Therefore, "[i]n the final analysis, the level of greed and corrup-
tion is dictated not by the nature of the entity providing the
153. VICTOR H. VROOM, WORK AND MOTIVATION 31 (1964); see also E.B. KNAUFT,
ET AL., PROFILES OF EXCELLENCE-ACHIEVING SUCCESS IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
(1991) (examining the superior leadership qualities of the managers of ten nonprofit
entities around the country).
154. Young, supra note 152, at 95.
155. Salamon, supra note 144, at 116.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 110.
158. Id. In order to judge the effectiveness of nonprofit firms, performance mea-
sures must be developed that take into account multiple constituencies and building
measures around them. See Rosabeth M. Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing Well
While Doing Good, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 154 (Walter
W. Powell, ed., 1987).
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goods and service[s], but by the integrity of the individuals
under whose direction the entity does business."5 '
IX. CONCLUSION
The development of the Public Purpose Doctrine in the nine-
teenth century clearly exhibits the desire of both the populace
and the courts to place some limit on government spending.
Because of the disastrous effect public aid to railroads had on
public treasuries, the courts, reacting to the public outcry, re-
fused to sanction aid to private corporations outside the inter-
nal improvement sector of the economy. Yet, the significance of
that historical development and the evils that gave rise to it
have been lost on present judiciaries who find a public purpose
in almost any proposed government expenditure. Thus, outland-
ish public debt and the public's perception of unethical political
behavior is the norm in this area of governmental expenditure.
Consequently, a solution is needed that will do much to soften
such a -perception and remove the incentive to deliver goods and
services of a lesser quality than what the public needs or de-
serves. Governmental-nonprofit partnering is one answer.
159. Telephone Interview with Janet Krupsaw, Former Service Coordinator for the
Health-Impaired Elderly of Cook County, MI. (August 1, 1994).
1346
